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Local prisons improve rehabilitation outcomes by 3 to 4 per
cent in 5 years
The much strengthened policy focus on rehabilitation in the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) in recent
years has meant that there is now time-series data available on individual prison performance
in reducing reoffending. At a time where as much analysis as possible is needed on how to
calibrate and measure rehabilitation, Simon Bastow presents latest MoJ figures, and shows
even marginal improvements take time.
In November 2010, I wrote a piece f or this blog on the launch of  the ‘rehabilitation
revolution’ in the UK of f ender management system. Behind the grand narrative and optimism
bias, there were at least signs that pragmatic steps were being taken to shif t the objectives of  the prison
system explicit ly towards rehabilitative outcomes, something that had been systemically lacking f or decades
previously.
One small sign was a new commitment by the Ministry of  Justice (MoJ) to publish reof f ending rates f or
individual prisons. While other core public sector institutions such as schools and hospitals had been
subjected to waves of  league-tabling throughout the 1990s and 2000s, prisons had systematically
managed to avoid this kind of  institution- level accountability.
Since then the MoJ has published reof f ending rates f or f urther annual cohorts (2007 to 2011) (see Tables
22a and 22b at the link), buried away though they are on the MoJ website. Admittedly, most of  these
cohorts predate the beginnings of  the ‘rehabilitation revolution’, but they give us an idea of  the types of
rehabilitative outcomes that NOMS and individual prisons have been achieving year-on-year, and the kinds
of  improvements that we should realistically expect.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of  average ‘proven’ reof f ending rates f or f ive dif f erent types of  prison (see
Figure 1 Note f or def init ion). I have used ‘box and whisker ’ plots here to show the distribution of  all prisons
in each category, with the ‘box’ showing the interquartile range (25% to 75%), and the ‘whiskers’ showing
upper and lower quartiles respectively. The line across the box denotes the median reof f ending rate across
all prisons in that category.
Figure 1: Rates of proven reoffending amongst prisoners sentenced to less than six months, by
different types of prison, 2007 to 2011
NOTE Ministry of Justice definition for ‘proven’ reoffending: any offence committed in a one year follow-up
period and receiving a court conviction, caution, reprimand or warning in the one year follow-up or a further six
month waiting period.
For each type of  prison, there is a cluster of  three boxplots. The red shows the distribution of  reof f ending
rates f or the cohort of  prisoners released f rom prison in 2007. The blue  shows the same rate f or the 2011
cohort. The grey shows the average reof f ending rate across all f ive annual cohorts.
Looking f irst at local prisons, generally holding shorter sentence prisoners, we can see quite narrow
clustering around 66 per cent f or the 2007 cohort. We can interpret this in various ways. Either most local
prisons have normalized a sense of  f atalism about this ‘two thirds’ rule, and have long since depriorit ized
ef f orts to boost rehabilitation. Or the structural f actors are so overwhelming, that whatever individual
prisons do to reduce the rate, the outcomes are still somewhere around two thirds. The reality is probably
somewhere between the two.
To what extent have local prisons been able to cut into this structural trend? How has f ive years of
‘proactive’ of f ender management policies reduced chronically stable reof f ending rates? The 2011 boxplot
suggests a mixed picture. We see a downward stretching of  the distribution, implying that some local
prisons have managed to reduce their reof f ending rates more signif icantly than others. Yet, at the same
time, the reduction of  the overall average is no more than 3 or 4 per cent.
In other types of  prisons, there are more accentuated signs of  improvement. For closed training prisons,
generally holding longer sentence prisoners, we see a reduction in reof f ending of  around 5 per cent
between 2007 and 2011, with comparatively higher downward stretching.
Open prisons tend to hold longer sentence prisons at the end of  their custody, and as a result have much
lower average levels of  reof f ending f rom the outset. Nevertheless it is clear that these prisons have shown
more considerable improvement downwards (up to 15 per cent), and a much more decisive shif t of  the
whole box rather than the ‘mixed picture’ stretching we see in the previous two.
Figure 2: A closer look at proven reoffending rates in individual local prisons, 2007 to 2011
There are variations in the rehabilitative perf ormance of  dif f erent types of  local prisons during this f ive-
year period. In Figure 2 above, I plot the same data on two axes, the horizontal showing the proven rate of
reof f ending amongst the 2007 cohort (i.e. the red boxplot above), and the vertical showing the average
change in reof f ending over f ive years (i.e. the grey boxplot). I dif f erentiate between public and privately-
managed prisons, as well as large and small public prisons.
All f ive privately-managed local prisons (Doncaster, Forest Bank, Altcourse, Parc, and Peterborough) have
managed to reduce their reof f ending rates between 2007 and 2011 by at least 1.5 per cent. Parc prison (run
by G4S since 1997) has reduced its average reof f ending rate by more than 4 per cent. Birmingham prison
(shown by the hollow triangle) was transf erred to G4S in 2011. From 2007 to 2010 it had managed to
reduce its reof f ending rate by nearly 6%, only to see the rate rise once more in 2011. Perhaps a
consequence of  the disruption to services caused by the transf er.
The mix of  rehabilitative perf ormance amongst the public prisons is striking, and in many ways, makes the
privately managed prisons look like f airly consistent perf ormers. For some large local prisons, such as
Wandsworth (W), reof f ending rates have remained broadly the same throughout this period, ref lecting its
f renetic churn as well as leadership uncertainty and resistant staf f  cultures over the years. At the other end
of  the spectrum, we f ind large public sector prisons outperf orming all others, such as High Down (HD)
(Surrey) and Leeds (L). It is perhaps no surprise that both of  these prisons had stable leadership teams
and imaginative governors in place f or most of  this f ive-year period.
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